Thus, once the copyright owner sold a copy of the work, that copy-in its physical manifestation-became the personal property of its new owner, who could resell, lend, or otherwise dispose of her chattel.4 So long as the library simply rotated possession of the book, the library remained fully within its rights as a property owner.5 Library patrons might, of course, manually copy or type out portions of the book for personal use, but these limited reproductions would have fallen within the "fair use" and "fair dealing" exemptions of U.S. and Commonwealth law, or under explicit private copying privileges found in continental copyright legislation.6 Once libraries began to avail themselves of the photocopier, however, they could no longer neglect copyright considerations. Photocopying could be used to preserve books and to fill gaps in collections when original formats were no longer available. Beyond these functions, photocopying could increase the library's ability to service users by multiplying the number of available copies or parts of copies. But once copies are being made, copyright issues are posed.7
To evaluate the severity of the copyright challenge, it is necessary to sketch 54 REPRESENTATIONS the contours of the U.S. "fair use" privilege, and its foreign-law analogs. Most, if not all, copyright laws afford certain exemptions from the author's or copyright owner's rights. One of the most widespread exceptions excuses copying that does not substitute for sale or licensing of the work.8 In the U.S. "fair use" exception, the question of potential economic harm caused by copying is central, but the broader public-interest issue of access to knowledge weighs heavily in the balance as well, especially when the reproduction is made for nonprofit educational purposes.9 In addition, in the 1976 Copyright Act Congress set forth special highly detailed rules under which libraries could engage in unauthorized copying.'0 These rules generally exempt archival copying" but would not permit a library to substitute photocopies for regular acquisitions.'2 The U.S. Copyright Act also details circumstances in which libraries may make copies of works or portions of works for users for their private study or scholarship.'3 Because the statute circumscribes the instances in which libraries may supply copies of documents to patrons, an important copyright issue concerns the provision of photocopies to persons outside the scholarly and nonprofit communities. Many libraries, particularly legal, medical, and scientific libraries, have clients who pay for the library's services. If these clients are not nonprofit institutions, any "fair use" claim is likely to be questionable. These clients may be able to save time and money by using a library to deliver documents; however, there is no reason they should be able to save additional money at the expense of the copyright holder. '4 In these instances, libraries charge and remit royalties to the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC), a consortium of publishers that collectively licenses its repertory of works to various users, including university libraries. The collective licensing mechanism permits the library to copy any and all of the licensed works, without having to obtain separate permissions each time a copy is made.'5 If the copyright owner of the client-requested work is not a member of the CCC and has no other licensing program with the library, the library is supposed to seek permission to copy each work each time an outside request is made. Not surprisingly, this can be a burdensome process.
Organizations for the collective licensing of photocopy rights exist in many other countries as well. In some countries, collective licensing resembles the activities of the CCC: libraries may remit the monies, but the fees are actually paid by the libraries' users. In others, however, the government may negotiate with the collectives to pay a sum covering all photocopying in educational institutions, thus covering nonprofit end users, such as students and teachers, as well. 16 Scanning the role of copyright in the transition to digital libraries. Many libraries are converting portions of their print collections to digital format. At the time they acquired the works they now intend to scan, the libraries may not have negotiated digital conversion rights. If the works thus to be converted are still protected by copyright, in what instances must permission to digitize be secured?
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Putting the work into digital format is only the beginning, from both a copyright holder's and a user's point of view. Once the work has been converted, it can be accessed in several ways. It can be viewed on-screen, it can be printed out, and it can be downloaded. Under copyright law, all of these constitute reproductions.'7 Which, if any, modes of access might be considered "fair use" or benefit from another copyright exception? Analysis will require analogizing digital access to the kinds of reproductions that qualified for exemptions in the hard-copy world. Applying the rules of yesterday's library to regulate use of technologies that will radically transform tomorrow's library might seem like trying to use a phonograph designed for wax cylinders to play a CD. Nonetheless, this analysis may at least help identify those areas in which current copyright rules may require reshaping.
Conversion to digital format. Converting a hard-copy work to computerreadable form entails reproducing the work. If the work is scanned, it is first reproduced as an "image file," containing an electronic picture of the pages. If that file is then converted to ASCII form,'8 the resulting "text file" constitutes the creation of another reproduction. Because the copyright owner normally enjoys the exclusive right to reproduce the work, must the library therefore secure permission to perform the conversions? I would anticipate that, at least in the U.S., rules that today afford libraries exemptions for archival photocopying also apply to optical scanning and text-file creation for the same purposes. If the library is permitted to make the copy, it should not matter what technology was employed to generate the reproduction.'9
Making the file available to reader-viewers raises a different problem. For a printed text, reading presents no copyright issues because copyright does not attach to the physical object. In the digital world, however, looking at the text does implicate copyright, because viewing the text on-screen entails making a reproduction of the text.20 The question therefore arises whether the digital equivalent of "looking at a book" requires the copyright owner's permission. I suspect that, although this act of viewing is analytically prima facie copyright infringement, were the issue to be litigated a court would excuse the copying as fair use. Although the work's format is different, the library is providing the same service of making the work available to users. A policy favoring easy and inexpensive public access to works of authorship underlies the fair use exemption.2' A court may therefore be unlikely to look sympathetically on a copyright holder's attempt to impose a pay-per-view requirement simply to access the work when no permanent copies are made.
The preceding discussion has addressed the access question as if the library would treat the digital copy like a hard copy, making it available only to one user at a time. In fact, however, digital copies, unlike hard copies, can be made available simultaneously to as many users as a network or online service permit. Establishment of a digital copy therefore can lead to a multiplication of user copies. 56 
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Creation of text files in order to multiply the number of copies in the library's collection would also, at least under today's rules, fall outside the free-copying boundary.22 The practical effect of converting a text from hard copy to digital is the creation of digital copies in addition to-or in lieu of-hard copies; accordingly, unless it determined to forgo one of the signal benefits of digital technology-multiplicity of access-the library will have to confront the copyright consequences of multiple reproductions. Thus, copyright considerations necessarily influence a library's disposal of its digital files, even if no copyright was infringed when the file was initially established.
For example, suppose the library wished to preserve its copy of a work still protected by copyright, such as Herbert Howell's 1942 treatise on copyright law,23 which we will assume was printed on acid paper and is slowly but surely burning itself up. We will further assume that the book is out of print, and unavailable at a reasonable price from other sources. In the U.S., these facts would entitle the library to convert the book to digital format. They would also permit the library to make the digital copy available to one user at a time. But they would not entitle the library to make the digital copy available to many users at a time. That kind of reproduction would require the authorization of the copyright holder.
By the same token, suppose that the library had multiple copies of certain high-demand, in-print books, such as Allan Farnsworth's treatise on contract law, and that the library wished to save shelf space by substituting digital copies for all but one hard copy. The first question is whether the library may establish the initial digital file without the copyright owner's permission. Because this work is currently available, the library cannot avail itself of an archival copying exception; it would, therefore, probably need permission to digitize in the first place.
How many copies may the library simultaneously generate from the Farnsworth digital file? Arguably, the library should be able, without permission, to create as many digital copies as it had hard copies. But this argument is weak; after all, if a library had four copies of a commercially available text, and loses three because borrowers fail to return them, the library is not entitled to free photocopies to restock its inventory.24 Moreover, the library's privileges "extend to the isolated and unrelated reproduction. . . of a single copy"; they do not cover "concerted reproduction" of "multiple copies of the same material, whether made on one occasion or over a period of time."25 Systematic substitution of digital for hard copies of particular works seems more like "concerted" than "isolated and unrelated" reproductions. As a practical matter, however, this question may not arise in this fashion: once the library must negotiate with the copyright owner to engage in the initial digitalization, it should also negotiate the number of copies, and the further reproductions that users make from them.
Copying from the digital copy. Let us assume that we are starting from a text file that the library created either within the bounds of the library's free-copying or fair use privileges, or with permission from the copyright owner. We already Copyright Without Walls? 57 know that making that file available to more than one user at a time means reproducing the work in a manner exceeding the traditional library prerogatives. The copyright owner will therefore assert legal control over the amount of and manner of access to the work. Similarly, the copyright owner will wish to regulate any further reproductions that libraries or users might make by printouts or downloading. Indeed, the owner might demand compensation for certain reproductions that would otherwise qualify for an exemption under the library copying or fair use provisions. Because the U.S. Copyright Act explicitly permits contractual override of the library copying privileges,26 it is foreseeable that, once the library is required to negotiate with the copyright owner in order to obtain permission to digitize at all, or to make more than one simultaneous copy, the copyright owner will endeavor to impose a host of additional conditions on access to and further reproduction of the work.27
On the other hand, if the library enjoyed a privilege initially to digitize the work and it restricts availability to one user at a time, the copyright owner would have no claim to demand additional compensation unless any further reproductions made by the library or its users exceeded the statutory exemptions. It is important to consider the application of these exemptions in the digital environment. This examination requires not only transposing the copying media from photocopying to printouts and downloading, but also evaluating whether the transposition leads to results inconsistent with the policies underlying the current rules.
Reproductions that currently qualify for exemption under U.S. law include a user's printing out or downloading short excerpts for private study or scholarship28 and a library's provision of a copy of even an entire work to a user for private study or scholarship when an original is no longer available at a fair price.29 However, in the second case, one might anticipate that the library should make such a reproduction available only in hard copy. A digital copy too easily lends itself to further reproduction, thereby undermining the reprint or reissue markets for the work and exceeding international norms of exempted reproductions.30
For the same reason, in those countries that permit free "private copying" of entire works, the exemption should be tailored to exclude private copying by means of downloading. Even if the further digital copy is made for purely private purposes, the medium so enhances the copy's potential to be fruitful and multiply that temptation is best avoided. Similarly, the provision of the U.S. copyright law that exempts a library from liability for copies made by patrons if the copies were produced on equipment made available, but unsupervised by, the library, requires rethinking.3' While the exemption might continue to apply for useraccessible printers attached to workstations, the library should be liable if, without the copyright owner's permission, it makes equipment available to users that enables them to download entire files.32 58 
Interlibrary loan practices afford a further illustration of the potential incompatibility of the current library copying exemptions and the electronic environment. The U.S. Copyright Act permits libraries to "participate in interlibrary arrangements that do not have, as their purpose or effect, that the library or archives receiving such copies or phonorecords for distribution does so in such aggregate quantities as to substitute for a subscription to or purchase of such work."33 Sending digital copies on interlibrary loan could achieve precisely that effect-because once a library acquired a digital copy, absent further limitations, the library would no longer require hard copies (or publisher-authorized digital copies). Were digital-format works to be made available through interlibrary loan, the originating library should at least accompany any freestanding digital version, such as a floppy disk, with limitations as to the number of users and the kinds of further reproductions. Similar limitations should apply to copies sent via electronic mail. Alternatively, the originating library could restrict the requesting library to online access from the originating library while denying permission to download; authorized downloading would be subject to the requesting library's agreement to destroy the copy.
Several of the accommodations just proposed have in common the attempt to respond to the transition to "libraries without walls" by erecting walls wherever possible. Thus, in a model in which hard-copy copyright concepts continue to dominate, fair use will remain shaped by the model of the printed book. That means, for example, that the law imposes a wall between the first, free, digital onscreen copy and the subsequent multiple copies that can be viewed simultaneously. The law maintains walls between documents and users by obliging libraries to limit user access to onscreen views or short printouts, because access by downloading too easily lends itself to generation of uncontrollable user copies. If digital publishers determine that it remains worthwhile to give libraries access to their works, they will almost certainly seek to condition that access upon compliance with a variety of restrictions. Publishers may wish to prevent certa kinds or quantities of user reproductions, or to charge for all uses over single viewings of the document. Publishers could enforce these limitations directly if the library is simply providing the user with a computer connection to the publisher. Publishers then could themselves limit initial access (onscreen viewing) to 60 REPRESENTATIONS certain categories of users; they could prescribe a maximum number of bytes to be reproduced by printing out or downloading; or they could completely prohibit downloading.
Digital documents that are distributed in freestanding format, such as CDROMs, may prove more susceptible to unlicensed copying than online sources.
Once the document leaves the producer's control, the producer cannot know firsthand who is viewing, who is copying, and how many copies are being made.
Nonetheless, technology affords the producer a variety of extra-copyright protections. For example, the library would not be permitted to make the CD-ROM directly accessible to users, but would be obliged to make it available through the library's local-area network (LAN). Such a network would respond to individual user-access codes, enabling the library either to screen out or to charge more for certain kinds of users identified by the publisher. The LAN could be programmed to limit or prohibit printing or downloading. Moreover, both CDROMs and online services could be "booby-trapped" to prevent unauthorized printing out or downloading, for example, by flashing warnings that the user's request may not be fulfilled; by "freezing" if the user attempts to make a further copy; or even by sending a virus to the user's disk if the user persists.
Contracting out offair use. Some of the limitations sought by digital publishers might override rights of libraries and users under fair use and library copying privileges, even after these privileges have been adjusted to account for the greater potential of digital copies to supersede or compromise the publisher's market. The U.S. Copyright Act provides that the library's privileges in no way affect "any contractual obligations assumed at any time by the library or archives when it obtained a copy or phonorecord of a work in its collections."38 It seems clear, therefore, that the policies underlying these exceptions to copyright protection are not violated if the library agrees to forgo its privileges.
The same provision of the U.S. Copyright Act also states that the library's special statutory privileges in no way affect "the right of fair use,"39 and the legislative report accompanying the 1976 Act indicates that the special privileges accorded to libraries give them greater leeway to copy than they would enjoy by application of fair use alone.40 Fair use in effect affords libraries and users some kind of free-copying "safety net." One should inquire, therefore, whether a library's agreement with a publisher to forgo whatever free-copying privilege might be available under fair use is permissible under the copyright law.
In addressing this question, one might first inquire why copyright law is at issue at all. In the world here posited, the publishers abandon copyright and seek to regulate all use by contract, on the premise that where copyright's protections have nothing more to offer them than do contract and technological controls, copyright taken together with its exceptions, particularly fair use, offers them less. In pressing a contract claim, the publisher is seeking to achieve copyrightCopyright Without Walls? 61 Judicial enforcement of contracts barring one party from copying the other's ideas is particularly noteworthy, because the federal determination not to protect ideas under copyright is very clear. The Copyright Act explicitly provides "in no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea."45 One might argue that this implies that no legal protection should be available, whatever the source.46 By upholding contracts that confer greater rights than copyright affords, these cases necessarily reject that proposition. As a general matter, moreover, U.S. intellectual property preemption decisions do not sustain the objection that limitations inherent to a formal intellectual property regime cannot be avoided by resort to a state law doctrine that dispenses with those constraints, at least when other constraints accompany the state law protection. The Supreme Court has, accordingly, declined to find state trade secret laws preempted by federal patent laws, even when they bear on the same subject matter.47 While patent protection is of short duration (seventeen years), and requires the patent holder to disclose the invention, a trade secret lasts as long as it remains a secret and, by definition, carries no requirement of disclosure. Such exceptions could be appropriate if they salvaged important copyright policies that would otherwise be frustrated in the move from copyright to contract. But the policies underlying fair use can be variously described, and not all characterizations conflict with the contract regime here imagined. Under one approach, fair use is a response to market failure: when the copyright owner cannot efficiently license the kind of copying in which the defendant is engaged, the use may proceed unlicensed.50 If, by contrast, there exist "reasonably priced, administratively tolerable licensing procedures,"''5 no gap exists for fair use to fill, and there is no need for the exemption. The contractual regime discussed here is consistent with this characterization, because the publisher can charge for every kind of use, and the electronic media can keep track of it all.
Nevertheless, fair use can also be described as an exception to the copyright owner's prerogatives, or even as a subsidy from the copyright owner, in favor of uses that benefit the public. This interpretation emphasizes the constitutional Copyright Without Walls? 63 purpose of copyright to "promote the progress of science (knowledge)." If, in certain instances, the law upheld the copyright owner's refusal to license the kind of copying in which a defendant seeks to engage, we would be permitting copyright to hinder rather than promote the progress of knowledge. 52 The progress of knowledge would be impeded because a defendant would have incorporated copied material into a new endeavor, such as a work of criticism or scholarship, that would have contributed to public enlightenment.53
That the "public benefit" rationale for fair use would mandate grafting a fair use exception onto our imagined contract regime is not clear. This rationale has traditionally focused on "productive use" of the copied material in the creation of new works, for which copying from old works may be necessary; it does not necessarily supply a justification for "intrinsic" copying-copying of a work to make "ordinary" use of it.54 Yet under the 1976 Act, libraries have enjoyed some degree of fair use copying, even though that copying would seem to be for "intrinsic" purposes. Library copying remains consistent with the public benefit rationale, if one contends that access to the works is either the predicate for a subsequent productive use of them, or, more abstractly, promotes the progress of knowledge, because researchers will be enriched by what they read.55
A role for "fair use breach" or mandatory user rights could be imagined if publishers imposed conditions on libraries that denied meaningful access to their works. More likely, however, publishers will not deny such access; they will want to charge for it in ways they did not charge, and could not have charged, in the hard-copy world. Today, the effect of declaring a use "fair" is to make it free of charge. Perhaps in a digital world, fair use would not be an all-or-nothing matter; a court might uphold the copying at issue, but require the copyist to pay for it.
The price the user would pay would be less than the price the informationprovider would have charged. In effect, a compulsory license regime might split the difference between user claims to free access and publisher initiatives to charge for all uses.56
But a compulsory license would be justified only if the publisher's rates were "unreasonable" according to criteria yet to be articulated. In the digital world, it remains to be examined if publishers will in fact make libraries pay "too much" for any access to documents. In a digital world, libraries could avoid the sunk costs of building and maintaining a paper collection. Online subscription would have to cost more on a yearly basis than hard-copy libraries cost, before the pricegouging objection would be borne out. Digital publishers might make libraries pay for simultaneous access beyond the first user, but this may still cost less than investing in additional hard copies. Moreover, competition among digital publishers should keep prices down. A more reasonable fear may be rooted in monopoly concerns: no competition exists because some publishers are the sole source of certain documents; these publishers, if unhappy in their negotiations with libraries, will someday pull the plug on the online system. In the hard-copy 64 REPRESENTATIONS world, the library always is in possession of the books; in the digital world, if the online publishers cut the supply, the library is left with inert workstations.
This examination has shown that digital media, by enabling publishers to keep track of all the uses being made of their works, also give publishers the opportunity to charge for all uses, including those that would have been free in a hard-copy world. One may therefore fear that publishers will be sorely tempted to "overcharge" for access to and copying of their works, especially if there is no longer a fair use doctrine to hold them in check. However, we do not now know whether, even accounting for new publisher charges, digital media will also This kind of catalog could be a very effective research tool, but portions of it also implicate rights in the referenced works. Level 1 does not raise a copyright issue, because this information is basic and involves minimal, if any, copying from the work. Level 2 is unlikely to offend the copyright laws, because the abstract contains the bare information necessary to identify the major ideas of the work.64 As such, either it is an uncopyrightable collection of "ideas," or copying it would be considered de minimis.
Level 3 becomes more troublesome, because the excerpts may be substantial.
If so, they pose a prima facie case of infringement, which might be overcome by a fair use defense. Similarly, including full-text works might constitute either infringement or fair use. In both cases, the catalog and its search program, as imagined, would make it possible for the user to call up onscreen all or substantial 66 REPRESENTATIONS parts of the digital work. If the catalog and search program do no more, these acts seem analogous to simply reading a hard-copy book and should not implicate copyright interests in the work viewed. However, if it is also possible for many users at one time to access the work in whole or in part, then the catalog is generating multiple copies of the referenced work, and this may exceed fair use bounds. By the same token, a "level 5" that enabled users to download the works would provoke copyright conflicts, although one that permitted printouts of excerpts might not.
In many instances, the library's catalog will not be able to act independently of the laws covering the works it lists. The catalog might be viewed as a search tool that interacts with text files. But if the text files originate from a digital publisher, the library's agreement with the publisher will govern incorporation of the works in the catalog. Copyright in the listed works remains an issue for digital works generated by the library (for example, by scanning its hard-copy collection)
and for which the library did not previously obtain permission to make these kinds of reproductions.
Conclusion
Legal analysis of copyright or contract rights in the library of tomorrow depends heavily on conditions that one can try to predict today, but that are likely to prove quite different tomorrow. Extrapolating from today's laws, and experiences in the transition to digital media, affords some guidance, but also highlights the shortcomings of analyses grounded in past presumptions derived from the capacities of print media. Existing copyright may be inadequate for the "library without walls." But substituting a contract regime may become far too burdensome, at least from the library's perspective. If the copyright doctrine of fair use survives the rise of contract in the digital world, it must be a different kind of fair use, one consciously adapted to the expanded capacities of digital communications. But its contours-never precise, even in the hard-copy worldcannot be articulated without a clearer picture of the kinds of contracts and communications the library of tomorrow will call into being. But deposit does not of itself entitle the library to copy the work. Having secured the copy by legal compulsion, the library may be able to avail itself of applicable library copying or fair use exemptions in copyright law to engage in limited disclosure of the work. Wider dissemination, however, will require permission.
Libraries that are not national deposit institutions may have difficulty making acquisitions from digital publishers. Similarly, digital publishers may be reluctant to authorize a national library to permit access to and copying of the work to any greater extent than the limited amount to which it is entitled under applicable copyright laws' free copying privileges-as adjusted to take account of digital media.
38. 17 U.S.C. ? 108(f)(4) (1988). As indicated earlier, libraries are in fact being asked to forgo some of their copying privileges in return for "site licenses" from publishers of digital media. One might inquire why publishers of hard-copy media did not seek to contract out of library copying privileges. The answer may be that, even if the thought of doing so had occurred, it is too difficult to control the copying of hard-copy media, especially when the document is available from sources other than directly from the publisher. 
